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Abstract. As personal devices become smarter, opportunities arise for
sharing services, applications and data between them. While web tech-
nologies hold the promise of being a unifying layer, browsers lack func-
tionality for supporting inter-device communication, synchronization,
and security. To address this, we designed webinos: a cross-device dis-
tributed middleware providing interoperability, compatibility and secu-
rity for mobile web applications. In this paper we present a case study of
the webinos project, showing how the architecture of webinos was spec-
ified, designed and implemented, and reflect on several lessons learned.
1 Introduction
The simple client-server online communication model is changing. Web applica-
tions in the form of web widgets [1] allow for oﬄine usage and caching [2], which
is particularly important for intermittent internet connections. In addition, mo-
bile networks are becoming overloaded and there is an increasing desire to use
local and peer-to-peer communication mechanisms wherever possible. At present
browsers cannot switch to other local networks, such as Bluetooth or ZigBee,
and so cannot take advantage of them for high-bandwidth local use cases such
as file transfer or media streaming between friends. There is a strong case for
the creation of middleware capable of supplying web applications with access to
local networks and device resources in a standard and secure way.
This requirement for more sophisticated web application middleware moti-
vated the creation of webinos [3]. The webinos platform aims to create a seamless
experience for users of web applications on different devices, including PCs, in-
car systems, set-top boxes and smartphones. This entails synchronising content
and application state between devices, adapting to changes in user context, and
providing standard JavaScript APIs to let web applications access device fea-
tures. The platform also supports a medium-agnostic messaging system allowing
local, peer-to-peer communication channels such as Bluetooth and WiFi. Given
that security and privacy are primary goals of the webinos project, a common
distributed policy architecture and authentication model is supported.
In this paper we present the webinos platform as a case study in creating
secure middleware for distributed web applications. We briefly describe its archi-
tecture and identify lessons learned during requirements capture, specification
and implementation. We conclude with several recommendations for platforms
with similar ambitions.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we provide background infor-
mation on web applications and interoperable middleware. Section 3 describes
the webinos concepts and architecture. We reflect on lessons learned during de-
velopment in Section 4 and make our recommendations in Section 5. Finally, we
present our conclusions in Section 6.
2 Background: Mobile Web Applications and Middleware
The following sections describe related projects and technologies, including web
applications, widgets and middleware.
2.1 Web Applications and Widgets
A web application in a mobile context is a web page or collection of web pages
delivered over HTTP which uses server or client-side processing to produce an
application-like experience within a web browser [4]. In comparison, web widgets
are interactive applications for displaying and/or updating local or remote data,
packaged to facilitate downloads to a workstation or mobile device [5]. As such,
widgets are similar to web applications but are packaged for installation.
2.2 Middleware and Related Systems
When defining middleware services, Bernstein [6] states that they ‘are generic
across applications and industries, they run on multiple platforms, they are
distributed, and they support standard interfaces and protocols’. In home envi-
ronments, Raatikainen et al. [7] identify that middleware also needs to support
dynamic configurability, environment monitoring – including device discovery
and capability management – and a mobile distributed information base provid-
ing synchronised, consistent, reliable and easily available information across all
personal devices.
Several cross-device application middleware systems have been developed
previously. CORBA’s initial motivation was to provide an environment that
would allow distributed applications running on heterogeneous platforms to com-
municate with each other. Similarly, the Java Runtime Environment and the .Net
Framework provide a set of common APIs and a platform supporting the ‘write
once run anywhere’ concept. However, these are primarily aimed at local rather
than web applications and have yet to fulfil their cross-device potential.
There are many related mobile technologies. Android and iOS supports na-
tive applications which run only on mobile and tablet platforms. The Chromium
browser and O/S support web applications, and Nokia and Opera also provide
cross-device widget runtimes. PhoneGap6 takes an alternative approach: it com-
piles platform-independent applications into native packages for each target de-
vice, together with a runtime providing standard APIs. This wide variety of
fragmented technologies motivates the need for interoperability.
The OMTP’s BONDI project in 2008 7 defined a common set of JavaScript
APIs for mobile web applications. BONDI developed a standardized open source
web and widget based application environment which has now been replaced by
the Wholesale Applications Community (WAC)8. Similarly, the W3C Device
APIs and Policy Working Group is currently developing device APIs with a
similar scope. In addition, the W3C Web Application Working Group is working
on several widget standards [1].
A common theme of related work is that it aims for compatibility and ex-
tended web application functionality [8] without the interoperability required by
users with multiple devices. For example, WAC does not make it easy for a web
application on a user’s PC to access APIs hosted on their smartphone. Data con-
trol and privacy are other missing features: existing middleware does not help
users to keep control of their personal data across multiple devices, despite the
rise in web applications storing data in the cloud [9].
3 The webinos Platform
The webinos runtime has been implemented for three target platforms, chosen
after an extensive analysis of device ecosystems. These are Android for smart-
phones and tablets, Windows for PC, and Linux variants for in-car systems and
set-top boxes. The implementation uses NodeJS, a JavaScript runtime for dis-
tributed network applications [10]. NodeJS had to be ported to Android, but
was then available on all target platforms. The rest of the platform was written
in device-agnostic JavaScript as well as some native C++.
3.1 Architecture and Concepts
Personal Zones webinos is based around the concept of personal zones, as
shown in Figure 1. A user’s personal zone is the set of all their devices. Each
personal zone has a master, the personal zone hub (PZH), which coordinates
communication, synchronises data and provides access to devices from the In-
ternet. All other devices have a web runtime (WRT) (much like a browser) which
displays web applications and process widgets. The web runtime has been ex-
tended with a webinos plug-in to connect it to a personal zone proxy (PZP)
which implements APIs, provides local access control and communicates with
the personal zone hub.
6 http://www.phonegap.com
7 http://bondi.omtp.org
8 http://www.wacapps.net/
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Fig. 1. Overview of webinos
Interoperability Interoperability between devices is provided through a com-
mon discovery service and eventing system. From an application developer’s
perspective, remote and local resources are accessible through exactly the same
APIs, and no additional remote procedure calls or message handling is required.
The webinos runtime can use remote services over an internet connection or
through local network technologies such as Bluetooth, WiFi and ZigBee. The list
of available devices can be dynamically discovered at runtime. All services are
identified through a service-type URI (e.g. http://webinos.org/api/events).
These can be found and filtered using the service discovery API’s findService
method. Applications call this method and then receive a callback for every
matching service found within a specified time limit. Found services are then
bound to instantiate them and registered for any changes in their state, e.g.
the service later becomes unavailable. The service can be used as a standard
JavaScript object.
Inter-application communication is achieved through use of the event API.
Each application can publish and subscribe to event messages of a certain type.
The event API’s implementation is constantly available on the personal zone hub,
which is the logical choice for a publish/subscribe server. However, any proxy
may also act as a server for the event API, allowing for ad-hoc collaborations
when no internet connection is available.
Security and Privacy The platform has several security features including an
access control policy system for APIs, a multi-level authentication model, and
encrypted communication channels.
Authentication is available for devices, users and applications. Widgets are
authenticated via signatures, and hosted web applications by HTTPS. Users au-
thenticate to the personal zone hub through an OpenID-based login. This allows
them to administer their personal zone, adding and removing devices. Devices
authenticate to one-another through mutually-authenticated TLS sessions, with
each device holding a certificate issued by the personal zone hub. Private keys
are stored using operating system provided keyring facilities. Device authentica-
tion is sufficient in most scenarios, avoiding the need for users to login explicitly
to webinos. The use of OpenID at the PZH means that no new identity or cre-
dentials are required.
4 Lessons Learned
4.1 Introducing new Concepts and Abstractions
The personal zone concept was developed during the design phase of the project.
This turned out to be a useful simplifying assumption for platform developers
to manage the complexity of a multi-device cross-platform application system.
It was initially assumed that every device would exist only in one personal zone,
and that each zone had a single owner. As a result, the zones could be considered
small, mostly-isolated networks of devices where only one user was present at
any time. This helped with architectural design and security – authentication
could be based partly on device identities – and progressed the project greatly.
However, it became clear that this was an over-simplification, as many home
devices are shared between people and do not have a single owner (e.g a family
PC or television). Assuming that these were all part of one zone would cause
problems for applications and services which require better user identities and
authentication. The design was subsequently changed to allow devices to run
several proxies. Unfortunately, this requires proxies on the same device to be
isolated from each other in different user accounts. User accounts have been
shown to have poor usability [11] in a home setting, and this requires every
user to be logged-in for the proxies to run and accept remote requests. It also
fails to account for systems which do not provide user accounts. While the so-
lution of multiple proxies per device was acceptable in the short-term, a better
implementation is required.
There are several lessons to take away from this experience. Firstly, the con-
cept of a user and user account is changing, and is often not a useful abstraction
or technical solution, particularly when dealing with many different types of de-
vice. Secondly, introducing a simple abstraction early on can be a curse as well
as a blessing: it can help progress development, but can also limit the satis-
faction of certain use cases in unpredictable ways. Finally, given that adapting
the technical implementation of a personal zone proxy is a difficult problem for
webinos platform developers, application developers (who are not as familiar
with the platform) may have a difficult time in using and understanding its con-
ceptual model and components. This corresponds to some of the findings from
focus groups [12] and suggests that even simple abstractions require considerable
documentation.
4.2 Cross-Device Security and Privacy Challenges
While good security practice encourages reuse of existing solutions, our approach
to adapt security architectures provided by WAC and BONDI was not straight-
forward. For example, the policy framework had to be adapted considerably to
deal with user identity rather than just application and device identity. There
were also more threats to consider: because each device is able to access others
in the same zone, a malicious application on one (e.g. a PC) could compromise
the security of data stored on another (e.g a smartphone). Another new threat is
that storing and synchronising data between devices effectively downgrades the
trustworthiness of stored data, as it could be affected by the least-trustworthy
device. If developers assume that stored data is trusted, they might not check for
malicious input, which could facilitate content-injection attacks. Both of these
new threats are the consequence of one device in a zone being vulnerable, and
used to attack devices which would be secure in isolation. This is compounded
by the fact that some devices will update at different intervals and frequencies
than others, and known vulnerabilities may persist.
One of the privacy-enhancing aspects of webinos ended up potentially con-
flicting with security goals. As an alternative to storing data on a web server,
application developers can choose to store personal information locally in a de-
vice and synchronise with the personal zone hub to update other devices. This
should increase user control and help satisfy privacy expectations, given that
users control their own hub and devices. However, losing any device could result
in the disclosure of all synchronised data, including potentially valuable intellec-
tual property and credentials. Also, should the personal zone hub be hosted by
an untrustworthy third party, information could be put at risk.
4.3 Developing in a Rapidly Changing Ecosystems
The cost of working in a rapidly-changing ecosystem had some unexpected con-
sequences. Mobile web applications changed considerably during the course of
the project. For example, the initial analysis of target platforms proposed devel-
oping for Meego, which has since been largely abandoned, as were several draft
W3C APIs such as the Gallery API 9.
The up-front specification approach also had problems. Although specifica-
tions were supposed to support early application development, they were not
useful without an implementation. Application developers had to create their
own stubbed APIs, and this separated platform and application development
effort. Our experience suggests that it is better to implement APIs early rather
than just committing to adopting a standard in the future.
9 http://dev.w3.org/2009/dap/gallery/
4.4 Scoping the Middleware and Specifications
Deciding on the scope and responsibilities of the middleware was a challenge.
In particular, distinguishing the security and privacy responsibilities of the web
applications from those of the middleware. Clearly the responsibility is shared,
but identifying where each attack is mitigated and what is expected of the ap-
plications has proven difficult. Part of this issue is user perception: the webinos
platform has security and privacy as a selling-point, but cannot guarantee this
without secure applications. Furthermore, there is a temptation to oﬄoad func-
tionality from the platform to applications to save cross-platform development.
Keeping track of where features were implemented required more communication
between developers of the platform and applications.
A related issue was defining the limits of the public specifications. The plat-
form has undocumented features and design choices that do not affect the ap-
plications, but might have an impact on future extensions. With an open source
project, these details tend to be shown only in the code, which may cause de-
sign problems later on. Therefore, the scope of documentation should have been
better defined.
5 Recommendations
We make the following recommendations for other projects attempting to provide
standard runtime environments on multiple platforms. First, the impact of cross-
device interaction on a security architecture should not be underestimated. Even
creating the threat models and identifying misuse cases is time consuming. It is
easy to make mistakes where the ambient authority of the local device is confused
with remote requests which require access control. The personal zone concept
helps, as it assumes that any messages received has come from an authenticated
source. We suggest devoting more time to security analysis of cross-device issues
early on in the design process, and considering the security of scenarios rather
than individual platforms or devices.
Second, any assumptions about cloud and application capabilities should be
made early in the system design. The natural tendency will be to push func-
tionality away from the middleware and on to either applications or cloud-based
services to save cross-platform implementation effort. However, it should be de-
cided in advance which features must not be implemented as cloud services or
be delegated to applications. Part of the design should involve allocation of se-
curity responsibilities between the applications, middleware and cloud services.
Any responsibilities which are placed on an application ought to have thorough
documentation suitable for developers. Otherwise, calling a middleware ‘secure’
can give the impression that any application using the middleware is automati-
cally secure and trustworthy.
Third, solutions respecting privacy can result in fragile endpoints with po-
tential for data loss and insecurity. Middleware is not the place to judge the
balance between privacy, user control and security, as this may be application-
specific. Designing for a specific set of applications can help make progress, and
we suggest embracing this approach, even though this may fail to satisfy some
later requirements
6 Conclusion and Future Work
Designing a cross-device interoperable application middleware is a challenge. We
have described the approach taken during the webinos project and the insights
gained from 18 months of design and development. For future work we intend
to validate our findings through developing the platform further and building
applications. This will include better modelling and analysis of the system and a
deeper inspection of security and privacy. More applications will be developed,
and we will also investigate how to apply the personal zone concept to corporate
use cases.
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